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To develop innovations in large, mature organizations, individuals often have to resort to underground, “bootleg” researchand development (R&D) activities that have no formal organizational support. In doing so, these individuals attempt to
achieve greater autonomy over the direction of their R&D efforts and to escape the constraints of organizational account-
ability. Drawing on theories of proactive creativity and innovation, we argue that these underground R&D efforts help
individuals to develop innovations based on the exploration of uncharted territory and delayed assessment of embryonic
ideas. After carefully assessing the direction of causality, we find that individuals’ bootleg efforts are associated with
achievement of high levels of innovative performance. Furthermore, we show that the costs and benefits of bootlegging
for innovation are contingent on the emphasis on the enforcement of organizational norms in the individual’s work envi-
ronment; we argue and demonstrate empirically that the benefits of an individual’s bootlegging efforts are enhanced in
work units with high levels of innovative performance and which include members who are also engaged in bootlegging.
However, during periods of organizational change involving formalization of the R&D process, individuals who increase
their bootlegging activities are less likely to innovate. We explore the implications of these findings for our understanding
of proactive and deviant creativity.
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Introduction
We made a small amount of the material, then showed
technically that it worked, then started to involve some
of our colleagues who I work very closely with. We made
some sort of prototype, we went and gave it to consumers,
got some consumer data, and at that point, when it all
started to look reasonable, we then let the organization
know about it.
—Extract from an interview with a senior
R&D technologist
The creativity and innovation literature has a long
tradition of describing the tension between autonomy
and accountability in the generation of innovations
(Burgelman 1983, Van de Ven 1986). Organizations
often struggle to find a balance between allowing staff,
especially research and development (R&D) workers,
enough flexibility and autonomy to explore the “novel”
and “unusual” and keeping them sufficiently reined in
to ensure that their innovative efforts are aligned with
company strategies, objectives, and priorities (Amabile
1996, Kanter 2000). Autonomy without accountability
may lead to R&D efforts becoming decoupled from
the organization, whereas too little autonomy and strict
accountability may tie R&D efforts too closely to the
organization’s past and current ways of working. There-
fore, organizations need to carefully assess the level and
type of autonomy granted to R&D staff.
Although some organizations allow “free time” for
their staff to engage in personal R&D efforts, most use
a range of formal project management tools to direct
and select among their staff’s R&D efforts to ensure that
these efforts are accountable to the wider organization
(Cooper and Edgett 2009). In recent decades, managers
have paid greater attention to formalizing parts of the
R&D process to help minimize costs and risks, partly in
response to the low rates of return to R&D in many lead-
ing science-based sectors and partly in response to the
increasing competitive pressure that large R&D active
firms face in their markets (Mowery 2009).
As the quote at the beginning of this section illu-
strates, in contexts where the ability of R&D pro-
fessionals to work outside the project structure of the
organization is severely restricted, individuals may seek
to increase their autonomy by taking some of their work
“underground” (Abetti 1997, Aram 1973, Augsdörfer
1996, Knight 1967). These underground activities are
described as “bootlegging,” named after the practice
of hiding alcohol in one’s boots, for example, during
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the U.S. Prohibition. We define bootlegging as the pro-
cess by which individuals take the initiative to work
on ideas that have no formal organizational support
and are often hidden from the sight of senior manage-
ment, but are undertaken with the aim of producing
innovations that will benefit the company (Augsdörfer
2005). The concept of bootlegging relates to the broader
streams of work on proactive creativity, which empha-
sizes the importance of personal initiative in creative
processes (Frese et al. 1996, Unsworth 2001), and cre-
ative deviance, which highlights that individuals often
deviate from formal work requirements in pursuit of cre-
ativity (Mainemelis 2010).
The existence of underground R&D efforts conducted
by scientists and engineers is frequently commented on
but rarely analyzed in detail. The literature on bootleg-
ging (Abetti 1997; Aram 1973; Augsdörfer 1996, 2005)
has produced a rich contextual understanding of why
and how bootlegging activities take place, yet it says
relatively little about the mechanisms through which
bootlegging may promote individuals’ ability to gener-
ate innovative outcomes. It also fails to account for how
the characteristics of different work contexts influence
the positive and negative aspects of the R&D work-
ers’ underground efforts. Thus, it tends to underplay the
dangers of bootlegging for both individuals and their
organizations.
To explore these aspects, we draw on theories of proac-
tive creativity and innovation to analyze how bootlegging
efforts increase the ability of the individual to gener-
ate innovations. First, bootlegging allows individuals to
explore divergent research directions that fall outside the
remit of formal projects (Burgelman and Sayles 1986,
O’Connor and McDermott 2004). Bootlegging provides
the individual with more freedom to explore uncharted
territory and to attain explorative advantage over col-
leagues who do not bootleg (March 1991). This advan-
tage ultimately translates into superior individual ability
to develop innovations that generate value for the orga-
nization. Although bootlegging counts as an illegitimate
activity, it can function as a channel through which
unconventional ideas may be realized. Second, bootleg-
ging allows individuals to delay the moment of moni-
toring and assessment by the organization until an idea
is reasonably developed (Cheng and Van de Ven 1996,
Garud et al. 2011). In more extreme cases, bootlegging
may even involve continuing to work on projects rejected
by formal management systems and re-presenting them
to the organization when the time and circumstances are
right (Mainemelis 2010). Because embryonic ideas or
ideas that conflict with established modes of working are
more likely to fail internal selection processes (Knudsen
and Levinthal 2007, March 2006), delaying their assess-
ment increases the chances that new discordant ideas may
eventually be incorporated into the organization.
Yet whether bootlegging activities lead to innova-
tion or result in a waste of organizational time and
resources may in large part depend on the work con-
text in which these activities take place. We build on
the concept of normative enforcement (Feldman 1984,
Mainemelis 2010, Merton 1968) to propose that individ-
uals may be unable to benefit from bootlegging in social
contexts where norms of behavior are strictly enforced.
By contrast, work environments that value attainment of
goals over the means used for their achievement provide
a supportive environment in which individual’s bootleg-
ging activities can lead to innovation. We argue that the
contingent effect of the emphasis in the work environ-
ment on normative enforcement is manifested in three
main ways.
First, building on the observation that groups that meet
their objectives have lower levels of normative enforce-
ment (Feldman 1984), we argue that high-performing
units with strong innovation track records can afford to
be more tolerant of deviant behavior. In such units, local
managers are more disposed to providing discretionary
resources for bootlegging and show less hostility toward
bootleg ideas when they are presented, making it eas-
ier for the individuals in these units to convert boot-
leg activities into realized innovations. Second, in units
where bootlegging is more widespread, individuals are
less likely to disapprove of the deviant behavior of col-
leagues and more likely to take the view that the norm of
working exclusively on formal projects need not always
be adhered to. Thus, bootleggers will be more likely
to find that colleagues offer positive reinforcement for
their bootlegging ideas and may help them navigate such
projects back into the formal stage-gate system. Third,
work environments that increase formalization of the
R&D process by introducing more rules and regulations
and stricter monitoring of R&D work signal a greater
emphasis on conformity to rules rather than achieve-
ment of creative goals. In this context, we suggest that
those who increase their bootlegging activity in parallel
with greater formalization—thus going against organiza-
tional objectives of increasing normative enforcement—
may alienate themselves from the organization, with the
risk that their creative efforts will be misaligned with
corporate objectives (Greene 1978).
The paper makes three contributions. First, we con-
tribute to the literature on the link between autonomy
and innovation (Amabile 1996, Kanter 2000). We argue
that autonomy affects innovation not only through the
level of autonomy formally granted by organizations but
also through the autonomy that individuals’ proactively
claim for themselves. In this context, we characterize
bootlegging as a vehicle enabling R&D scientists and
engineers to achieve greater autonomy to define their
research agendas and goals in settings where this is
not formally granted. Second, we ground the concept
of bootlegging in the wider literature on informal R&D
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and proactive and deviant creativity processes in orga-
nizations (Mainemelis 2010, Unsworth 2001), advancing
understanding of the mechanisms that enable individu-
als to profit from bootlegging. In particular, we identify
exploration of uncharted territory and delayed assess-
ment of embryonic ideas as major factors linking boot-
legging to individual innovation performance. Third,
following the argument that bootlegging can flourish in
units with relatively low levels of normative enforcement,
we identify the organizational contingencies that dic-
tate whether individuals—and indirectly, organizations—
ultimately profit or lose from bootlegging, and we con-
struct a theoretical link between individuals’ proactive
and deviant creative efforts and the organizational factors
that may moderate their impact on innovation.
Bootlegging and Innovation
The Role of Individuals in Generating Innovation
Scientists and engineers in R&D organizations are pri-
marily judged on their ability to harness the creative
potential of new knowledge and technologies to find new
products, processes, and services (Amabile 2000, West
and Farr 1990). Accordingly, the focus of performance
assessment in R&D is largely on the ability of the indi-
vidual to contribute to the development of novel and
useful ideas that will create value for the organization
(Griffin and Hauser 1996). Thus, although innovation
may be a team effort and most often achieved within
a managed process, the performance of R&D scientists
and engineers is typically assessed on the basis of their
individual contributions to successful outcomes (Sarin
and Mahajan 2001). This tendency to focus on individ-
ual contributions is heightened in dual-career structures
common in R&D, where scientists and engineers are
required to scale “technical career ladders” as opposed to
managerial ones (DiTomaso et al. 2007). R&D scientists
and engineers who pursue technical careers are freed
from managerial tasks, enabling them to concentrate on
the discovery and development of new creative ideas that
contribute to the organization’s innovative efforts.
Although the innovation literature identifies a broad
range of individual and organizational factors that may
influence individual innovative performance in R&D
contexts (e.g., Scott and Bruce 1994), there is signif-
icant tension between autonomy and accountability in
the management of R&D workers (Kanter 2000). Inno-
vation studies traditionally suggest that creativity and
innovation are fostered by allowing individuals sub-
stantial autonomy (Amabile 1996, Bailyn 1985, Pelz
and Andrews 1966). It is understood that a degree of
“playfulness” stimulates individuals to come up with
nonobvious, nontrivial, or groundbreaking ideas and to
incorporate elements of unplanned variation within the
frame of set project objectives (Miner 1994). To extend
Kanter’s (2000, p. 168) metaphor of letting a thousand
flowers bloom, organizations need to allow individuals
the autonomy to experiment with the “organic,” the “nat-
ural,” and even the “wild” side of innovation. Research
at the organizational level suggests that formal rules and
procedures may constrain the flexibility and creativity
required for the exploration of new and valuable oppor-
tunities and limit the scope for experimentation (Benner
and Tushman 2002, Burns and Stalker 1961, Jansen
et al. 2006).
Yet the desire to ensure autonomy in the search for
new ideas and the development of innovations must be
balanced by a level of accountability (Kanter 2000).
The freedom to let a thousand flowers bloom can result
in a garden full of weeds if this freedom spirals out of
control and individuals’ innovation efforts are no longer
geared toward the needs and goals of the organization
(Kanter 2000, Sharma 1999). To shape and structure
the R&D process, most organizations use a range of
formal processes such as stage-gates to ensure that the
creative efforts of R&D staff remain aligned and that
R&D budgets are put to productive and efficient use
(Cooper 1990, Schilling 2010). These tools provide a
formal structure to partially reduce the inherent uncer-
tainty of the R&D process through the enclosing of
creative efforts in project management structures. These
kinds of approaches are critical also for enabling project
selection, allowing the ideas of different individuals to
be judged against one another (Knudsen and Levinthal
2007). Selection criteria help to ensure that the R&D
budget is distributed across a balanced portfolio that
includes short- and long-term objectives, has senior man-
agement support, and is aligned with the organization’s
overall strategy and capabilities. Although these meth-
ods are most often applied to the management of down-
stream innovation projects, it is increasingly common to
apply them to the front end of the innovation process
(Cooper and Edgett 2009).
Forms of Autonomy in R&D
Organizations have different ways of dealing with the
costs and benefits of allowing their R&D staff auton-
omy. Bailyn (1985) suggests that in R&D contexts, two
types of autonomy are particularly relevant: operational
and strategic. Because the typical R&D organization is
characterized by the employment of highly skilled indi-
viduals who work on complex and difficult projects,
it is common for R&D staff to be allowed high lev-
els of operational autonomy in their work (Amabile and
Gryskiewicz 1987). That is, within a given resource
envelope, the means by which set goals are achieved
are left largely to the individual (Bailyn 1985). Some
organizations formally grant staff a degree of strate-
gic autonomy that gives researchers the opportunity to
define their own research agendas and goals and set the
overall direction of their R&D undertakings (Amabile
and Gryskiewicz 1987, Bailyn 1985). Organizations
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may allow—even encourage—a degree of playfulness
(Miner 1994). For example, Google allows its staff to
spend 20% of their time on personal projects and claims
that 50% of its innovations originated in such efforts
(Iyer and Davenport 2008).
However, few organizations are willing or able to put
in place similar arrangements; most severely restrict the
strategic (although not operational) autonomy of their
R&D staff by allocating their time to working exclu-
sively on formal projects with well-defined goals and
objectives. This approach may not always be well suited
to capturing the features specific to the R&D process, in
which path-breaking ideas can take shape only through
additional investment and cognitive efforts with less
strictly defined boundaries (Nelson and Winter 1977).
Also, although some novel ideas become incorporated
within formal projects, there is a high risk that they
will be prematurely rejected in the stage-gate process
(O’Connor and DeMartino 2006) since there is insuf-
ficient time for them to mature and show convincing
market potential. The selection process in organizations
is likely to reject projects that do not conform to the
firm’s established ways of working, a problem that is
especially acute in large, mature companies (Knudsen
and Levinthal 2007).
Bootlegging in R&D
As a result, individual R&D workers may resort to infor-
mal methods in order to obtain greater strategic auton-
omy. They may decide to work underground to devote
considerable time to bootleg projects and to nurture
ideas before revealing them to the formal management
system (Abetti 1997, Augsdörfer 1996, Knight 1967).
They may also decide to continue working on a project
that has been formally rejected by the organization
(Mainemelis 2010). Thus, we propose that bootlegging
is a vehicle that enables individuals to obtain greater
strategic autonomy in their R&D efforts. In line with
Augsdörfer’s (2005, p. 2) definition, we describe boot-
legging as an R&D activity in which motivated indi-
viduals secretly engage in bottom-up, nonprogrammed
innovation efforts not officially authorized by manage-
ment but which are for the benefit of the company. This
definition incorporates three key elements.
First, bootlegging is a secret activity in the sense that
individuals’ work plans do not provide any formal autho-
rization for these activities. Bootleggers deviate from
their formal work requirements to build into their work
an element of creativity that they cannot place in their
day-to-day project work (Masoudnia and Szwejczewski
2012). Although colleagues and sometimes line man-
agers may be aware of the bootlegging activities, such
activities typically take place out of sight of senior man-
agement (Augsdörfer 2005). Thus, although intended
for the benefit of the organization, bootlegging quali-
fies as a risky behavior. In extreme cases, bootlegging
can be seen as a form of creative deviance where indi-
viduals continue to work on projects that have been
formally stopped by management (Mainemelis 2010).
The absence of formal organizational approval distin-
guishes bootlegging from free-time models of innovation
support, such as 3M’s 15% rule (Gundling and Porras
2000). Bootlegging also differs from skunkworks and
other structured initiatives that focus on radical innova-
tion within separate dedicated units, where individuals
can work outside the normal rules of the organization
(Tushman and O’Reilly 1996).
Second, bootlegging is a bottom-up, nonprogrammed
activity. In this context, bootlegging can be seen as a
behavior involving individuals taking personal initiative,
associated with an active and self-starting approach
to work (Frese et al. 1996). Those individuals who
exhibit proactive behaviors make persistent efforts, often
in the face of considerable barriers, and go beyond
formal requirements. These efforts may include engag-
ing in proactive creativity, actively searching for prob-
lems to solve, and generating unsolicited new solutions
(Unsworth 2001), described by Levinthal and March
(1981, p. 309) as “the pet projects of playful engi-
neers.” In this context, bootlegging is not simply a one-
off activity; rather, it is an approach to R&D work in
which individuals operate partly outside the formal sys-
tem to develop new ideas through informal preproject
work or underground continuation of rejected projects
(Augsdörfer 2005). The bottom-up and nonprogrammed
nature of bootlegging makes it different from organiza-
tional initiatives such as brainstorming or other forms of
institutionalized experimentation (Miner 1994).
Third, although bootlegging activity is illegitimate,
the innovations arising from underground efforts are
legitimate. Individuals tend to be rewarded for innova-
tive outcomes regardless of whether or not they have
been achieved through legitimate means (Mainemelis
2010). Bootlegging appears to be focused on achiev-
ing organizational rather than individual goals, and
it thus can be classified as a form of constructive
deviance (Warren 2003). Bootlegging should not be
regarded as a form of “hobby” innovation (Dahlin et al.
2004) or considered unethical, pro-organizational behav-
ior (Umphress and Bingham 2011). Despite being a
type of deviant behavior that may violate organiza-
tional norms—particularly if these underground efforts
are unsuccessful—bootlegging does not involve actions
that violate societal norms, values, or rules of proper
conduct.
Although the literature on bootlegging and associated
concepts of proactive creativity and creative deviance
has grown in recent years, very few, if any, studies inves-
tigate what impact these behaviors have on individual
performance in terms of generating innovations or how
the value of these efforts is contingent on the individ-
ual’s work environment. To fill this gap, we explore two
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main questions: (1) Does bootlegging make individuals
more innovative? And (2) what organizational contexts
enable individuals to profit 4or lose5 from bootlegging?
Bootlegging and Individual Innovation Performance
The primary purpose of R&D is to generate practical
ideas that can be commercialized or implemented as
new products and processes; thus individuals in R&D
organizations are assessed on the basis of their efforts
that contribute to this goal. Researchers differ in how
they approach the R&D process and in the extent to
which they seek structural autonomy through bootleg-
ging. Their choices can have important implications for
their ability to develop new products, processes, and ser-
vices. More specifically, we suggest that bootlegging has
two advantages for individual-level innovativeness.
First, bootlegging allows individuals to follow uncon-
ventional paths to explore novel ideas, which reduces the
barriers to developing innovations in mature organiza-
tions. Smith (2003) shows that creative outcomes within
mature organizations are often the result of unconven-
tional development pathways. In their study of corporate
entrepreneurship, Burgelman and Sayles (1986) note that
novel ideas often emerge in organizations from the bot-
tom up as a result of individual proactivity rather than
as a product of structured decision making or manage-
ment strategy. Indeed, research has shown that formal
process management systems can constrain the flexibil-
ity and creativity required for the exploration of new
opportunities (Benner and Tushman 2002). By operating
free of the “straitjacket” of formal management systems,
individuals achieve the flexibility to explore directions
that fall outside the remit of formal projects or are not
constrained by the need to meet short-term strategic
objectives (Burgelman 1983). Because bootleg efforts
tend to be unstructured and result from personal initia-
tive, they are likely to involve wider search efforts in
unconventional directions because they do not require
that the individual’s search efforts be directly linked to
the requirements or needs of the organization from the
outset (O’Connor and McDermott 2004). Such efforts
allow individuals more freedom to explore uncharted
territory, providing an explorative advantage over their
more constrained colleagues (March 1991). Bootlegging
gives individuals a channel through which to elabo-
rate new ideas informally alongside more formalized
attempts (Mainemelis 2010) that are perhaps outside the
company’s strategy or the individuals’ permitted fields
of work (Masoudnia and Szwejczewski 2012). In addi-
tion, bootlegging may affect individual innovative per-
formance indirectly. Exploration advantages associated
with bootlegging may spill over to individuals’ formal
work and enable them to introduce greater novelty and
creative thinking into their formal projects, thus boosting
the ability to drive innovation within the formal system.
Second, by engaging in bootlegging, individuals can
delay the assessment of novel ideas and postpone judg-
ment by the wider organization on their usefulness
and novelty (Garud et al. 2011, Mainemelis 2010).
Individuals who engage in bootlegging can explore their
ideas without having to document, justify, and codify
their elements before they are reasonably well devel-
oped, and thus they avoid the trap of premature exposure
of an idea before it is “ripe” for organizational exploita-
tion (Koch and Leitner 2008). This delay allows the
accumulation of richer, more compelling evidence about
the merits of the idea. For an idea to pass the selection
processes in large, mature organizations, which tend to
be conservative, solid evidence is required of its poten-
tial (Dougherty 1992, Knudsen and Levinthal 2007).
Insufficient evidence of the potential for future rewards
means ideas that are discordant with existing knowledge
are likely to be rejected (Cheng and Van de Ven 1996,
March 1991). However, a level of risk and imprecision
is frequently a prerequisite of true novelty. As March
(2006, p. 210) suggests, “Most attempts to distinguish
creative instances of craziness from useless or dangerous
ones at an early stage impose criteria of conventional-
ity on craziness and thereby impose self-defeating filters
that reduce novelty.” Even after ideas have been rejected
by the organization, bootleggers may keep these ideas
alive (Mainemelis 2010) to collect more evidence and to
strategically pick the time and place to (re)expose them
to senior management (Garud et al. 2011). By presenting
an idea only when its value can be demonstrated and at a
time when the organizational environment is likely to be
more receptive, bootleggers increase the chances of their
efforts being incorporated into the firm’s range of prod-
ucts or processes. Based on these two advantages, we
posit the following.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Individuals’ bootlegging is posi-
tively related to their innovative performance.
The Contingent Role of Normative Enforcement
in the Work Environment
It is unlikely, however, that bootlegging will be uni-
formly beneficial to individuals. Building on the concept
of normative enforcement (Feldman 1984, Mainemelis
2010, Merton 1968), we posit that individuals will be
better able to take advantage of unconstrained explo-
ration and delayed assessment of unconventional ideas
if they operate in work environments where the norms
of behavior are not too rigidly enforced. Bootlegging
is an illicit activity that is typically hidden from senior
managers and that deviates from the normative behavior
of allocating one’s time exclusively to formal project
engagements. Yet work environments may differ in the
extent to which this norm is enforced by local man-
agers or colleagues. At one extreme, work environments
may prioritize conformity to norms and rules so that
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the ways in which goals are achieved becomes more
important than the goals themselves (Mainemelis 2010).
In such environments, bootleggers may receive little
support for their activities or may encounter hostility.
At the other extreme, work environments that empha-
size the pursuit of creative goals while compromising
on the enforcement of normative behavior may provide
bootleggers with financial resources, advice, and support
to bring their ideas to fruition. Thus, we propose that
units with higher levels of innovation performance and
higher average levels of bootlegging will have relatively
lower levels of normative enforcement and will help
individuals to innovate through bootlegging. By contrast,
increased formalization and expectations of adherence
to organizational norms will make it more difficult for
those who increase their bootlegging activity to realize
its advantages. We explore each of these contingencies
in more detail below.
Unit Performance and Bootlegging. Within large R&D
organizations, there is considerable variation in the pro-
ductivity of different R&D units; some have better track
records of generating innovations than others. Feldman
(1984) argues that groups or units that achieve their
goals can afford to be more tolerant of deviant behav-
ior than groups that fail to meet their goals; the latter
are more likely to reject deviation from the norm. Based
on this line of reasoning, we suggest that unit-level per-
formance significantly shapes the benefits and costs of
bootlegging for individuals.
First, because high-performing units are less likely to
attribute importance to strict adherence to organizational
norms, they are more likely to lend informal support to
an individual’s bootlegging activities. Although bootleg
projects are underground activities, local managers may
make small amounts of resources available on a dis-
cretionary basis (Augsdörfer 2005) to help individuals
realize the exploration advantages of bootlegging. Such
resources are typically more readily available in innova-
tive units, which may have accumulated slack resources
from past success (Cyert and March 1963, Levinthal
and March 1981, Voss et al. 2008). In poorly perform-
ing units, pressure to achieve formal targets may drive
local managers to ensure conformance to organizational
norms. In these environments there will be little will-
ingness to spare resources to indulge bootlegging efforts
(Mainemelis 2010). High-performing units thus provide
better opportunities for individuals to develop their ideas
and enhance the quality of their bootleg projects, along-
side work on their formal projects. Individuals in suc-
cessful units are likely to produce more mature ideas
with greater potential for success. These ideas are more
likely to be incorporated in the organization’s formal
products and processes.
Second, successful units are also less likely to be
hostile to ideas that deviate from established behaviors.
This, in turn, increases the chances that ideas originat-
ing from bootlegging will survive their eventual assess-
ment by the organization. These high-performance units
will be less bound by norms of accountability for R&D
efforts, more likely to tolerate a degree of “irresponsible
search” and may relax organizational controls (Levinthal
and March 1981, p. 309). Moreover, senior managers
are likely to be hostile to illegitimate innovation efforts
from units with a poor reputation for novelty, whereas
members of high-performance units may be allowed to
deviate from the organizational norms for R&D account-
ability. Thus, once revealed to the organization’s project
management system, bootleg projects emanating from
innovative units are more likely to convince senior man-
agers than are initiatives from less innovative units.
For these reasons, we posit the following.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Unit-level innovative perfor-
mance moderates the relationship between individuals’
bootlegging and their innovative performance, such
that the positive effect of bootlegging on individual
innovative performance is stronger (weaker) in units
with higher (lower) levels of innovative performance.
Average Unit Bootlegging and Individual Bootleg-
ging. The work environment’s emphasis on conformity
to norms does not depend exclusively on the views of
local managers and senior decision makers. A group’s
level of normative enforcement is determined in large
part by the attitudes of coworkers (Feldman 1984). R&D
units in large organizations can differ substantially in the
extent to which members of the unit work beneath the
surface of the formal organizational structure, deviating
from organizational norms over the allocation of time
exclusively to formal projects. We suggest that there are
two reasons why individuals that work in units with
high levels of underground activity may be better able to
exploit their bootlegging activities to generate innovative
outcomes.
First, the presence of fellow bootleggers signals that
the work environment is characterized by low norma-
tive enforcement. Thus, individuals surrounded by boot-
legging colleagues are more likely to obtain positive
reinforcement from their local peers for their attempts
to explore novel and unusual directions. Bootlegging
typically does not occur entirely in isolation but benefits
from the support of colleagues in the form of discussion
and interaction around bootlegging ideas (Augsdörfer
2005). For example, individuals may be able to obtain
material and logistical support from fellow bootleggers
to enrich the evidence supporting their ideas. Individuals
may also be influenced by the behavior of their immedi-
ate group (Bercovitz and Feldman 2008) and learn from
the way its members go about developing innovations
underground. Therefore, a work environment with high
levels of bootlegging may stimulate individuals to profit
from their own bootlegging efforts. By contrast, in units
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with low levels of bootlegging, fellow R&D scientists
and engineers may be unsupportive of individuals who
break from organizational norms of accountability, mak-
ing it more difficult for them to bring to fruition the
ideas that emerge from their bootlegging efforts.
Second, in units with high levels of bootlegging, boot-
leggers are more likely to benefit from the experience
of others in reintroducing bootleg ideas into the formal
project management systems that will allow such an idea
to be incorporated in innovative outcomes. Units with
high levels of bootlegging may have local routines and
practices in place to enable bootleggers to navigate the
path to bring ideas to the attention of the wider organi-
zation, including senior managers (Garud et al. 2011).
Widespread bootlegging activity in a unit—and perhaps
successful precedents—may accustom unit members to
deviation from organizational norms. In units with low
levels of bootlegging, there is little experience in how to
overcome the barriers to acceptance of ideas that have
“come in from the cold.” In this context, individuals’
bootlegging efforts are less likely to result in innova-
tions. Thus, we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Unit-level bootlegging moder-
ates the relationship between individuals’ bootlegging
and their innovative performance, such that the positive
effect of bootlegging on individual innovative perfor-
mance is stronger (weaker) in units with higher (lower)
levels of bootlegging.
Increasing Bootlegging in Periods of Formalization.
Despite the merits of unstructured initiatives such as
bootlegging for the generation of innovations, many
organizations impose formal structures and accountabil-
ity routines on the fuzzy front end of the innovation
process (Cooper and Edgett 2009, Reid and De Brentani
2004). Formal R&D management approaches have been
introduced at the front end of innovation in an attempt to
strengthen the organization’s control over—and monitor-
ing of—the direction of individual search efforts in a bid
to render the process of idea generation and early-stage
innovation more efficient and cost-effective. In this con-
text, formalization is a move toward increased emphasis
on normative enforcement and a signal of the promi-
nence of the rules and procedures through which crea-
tive goals are achieved relative to the achievement of
these goals.
These attempts to formalize the early stages of the
innovation process can represent major changes in
the way scientists and engineers work (Bercovitz and
Feldman 2008), most notably by reducing their strategic
autonomy in the pursuit of their daily work. The lit-
erature on organizational change shows that individuals
respond in different ways to organizational change
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Ultimately, the success-
ful implementation of a change initiative depends on the
individual changing his or her behavior in the intended
direction (e.g., Whelan-Berry et al. 2003). In the context
of formalization of the front end of innovation, some
may engage in less bootlegging activity, signaling their
conformity to the organization’s desire for more control
over the front-end innovation process. However, some
may resist the changes imposed by the organization and
respond by increasing their bootlegging efforts. In con-
texts where organizational change threatens freedoms
that are important to an individual’s work (e.g., reduc-
ing strategic autonomy), the response may be resistance
(Ford et al. 2008). In an attempt to retain strategic auton-
omy, and potentially out of frustration with the organi-
zational change being implemented, some may respond
to the organization’s attempts at control by increasing
their levels of deviance (Lawrence and Robinson 2007).
We argue that, despite the advantages of bootlegging
remaining intact, increasing the level of this activity
during a period of organizational change toward
greater formalization may harm individuals’ innovation
performance. Greene (1978, p. 487) discusses how
formalization processes and the introduction of organi-
zational guidelines may become a “source of alienation,
particularly for professionals.” In these circumstances,
bootleggers who increase their efforts run the risk that
those efforts will become increasingly misaligned with
corporate R&D objectives. This misalignment can be
detrimental to the bootlegger’s ability to be innovative
for two reasons.
First, the decoupling between individual efforts and
the organization may harm the individual’s ability to
develop innovations that can be successfully exploited
by the organization. Increased bootlegging during a
period of formalization can result in exploration activi-
ties being too far removed from the firm’s portfolio of
projects and strategic initiatives, and they may separate
them from the ideas and work of colleagues. Increased
bootlegging during the formalization of R&D is thus
seen as greater deviation from organizational norms;
as a result, bootleggers may find fewer willing accom-
plices when they reach out for support or guidance from
others in the organization. This compromises the abil-
ity of the individual to convert the bootleg idea into a
successful innovation. Similarly, the scope for spillovers
from increased bootlegging efforts to formal projects is
reduced; formal projects with well-defined goals from
the front end to downstream will have little scope to
incorporate elements of novelty that deviate excessively
from corporate goals.
Second, the benefits of delayed assessment may be
compromised by increased bootlegging during formal-
ization. At such times, bootleggers may be able to
continue to delay assessment by taking projects under-
ground. However, the increased misalignment of their
creative work as a result of the imposed organizational
changes increases the likelihood of rejection when the
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project is eventually revealed. In times of greater for-
malization, those who increase their bootlegging are
unlikely to find a receptive and tolerant environment for
their underground efforts.
Thus, we expect that increased bootlegging during
a period of formalization will be negatively associated
with individual innovation performance. This does not
contradict our earlier argument. Hypothesis 1 posited
that the level of individual bootlegging is positively asso-
ciated with individual innovation performance; here, we
focus on changes in levels of bootlegging efforts dur-
ing periods of formalization. Thus, we hypothesize the
following.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). During a period of increased
formalization, increases in individual bootlegging will
be negatively related to their innovation performance.
Research Context, Data, and Study Design
The present study was undertaken in Neptune, a pseu-
donym for a large, technology-intensive multinational
company. Neptune operates in multiple highly competi-
tive product markets and has built a strong reputation for
developing innovative products and processes. The firm
invests heavily in R&D at multiple sites on several conti-
nents and is a keen user of process management systems
for R&D. Despite the company’s reputation as a leading
innovator, senior management expressed some concern
that Neptune struggles to develop innovations; a consid-
erable share of Neptune’s R&D efforts is focused on sus-
taining and improving the existing portfolio of products
and technologies rather than on developing new ones.
In its R&D organization, Neptune employs a dual-
career ladder system that distinguishes between techni-
cal and managerial careers. All those on the technical
career ladder are senior scientists and engineers who
have contributed significantly to innovating Neptune’s
product portfolio. They are expected to be subject spe-
cialists, and most have doctoral degrees. They perform
a number of different job roles, including product devel-
opment, process engineering, and design. They have no
formal project management responsibilities, which frees
them from administrative duties.
We collected data on the community of technical R&D
staff, following a two-step approach. In the first step, we
interviewed 25 senior members of the technical career
ladder and 10 R&D managers. Interviews lasted approxi-
mately 60 minutes and were aimed at a better understand-
ing of the work contexts of these individuals. Interviews
were semistructured; interviewees were asked to describe
their professional histories, the nature of their innova-
tive efforts, their approach to conducting R&D, and the
tactics used to search for new ideas.
The second step involved a survey of all 600 senior
scientists and engineers on the technical career ladder.
The survey was administered electronically in 2010.1
After three reminders, we received 408 responses,
a response rate of 67%. The respondent population
was representative of the overall population in terms of
grade, tenure, and location. We compared early and late
survey respondents to determine whether there were sig-
nificant differences in the responses to our main ques-
tions; we found no statistical differences (Armstrong and
Overton 1977). After removing responses with incom-
plete or missing variables, we were left with a final sam-
ple of 238 individuals.
As measuring bootlegging was a core part of the sur-
vey, we developed a new measure. Although there
are existing scales that capture individual-level explo-
ration (e.g., Mom et al. 2009) and intrapreneurship (e.g.,
Antoncic and Hisrich 2001), these were not suited to
our research question on individuals’ underground and
possibly deviant forms of exploration or to our setting
in which all R&D staff routinely engage in high lev-
els of exploration and intrapreneurship. Although our
interviews were designed to elicit rich descriptions of
individuals’ bootlegging efforts, interviewees were reluc-
tant to report on their bootlegging efforts in a company-
supported survey for fear of exposure to and sanction by
senior managers. We decided to make the survey anony-
mous, similar to the approach taken in other studies deal-
ing with sensitive or deviant behaviors in organizations
(Hannah 2005).
Partway through our study, the organization intro-
duced a new system to formalize the front end of the
innovation process (see Cooper and Edgett 2009 for a
description of similar initiatives). The system created
a structured process for judging the merits of early-
stage R&D efforts. Both before and after the formal-
ization, individuals in Neptune were required to register
their early-stage ideas as projects in the formal system;
the formalization imposed a greater level of organiza-
tional accountability through the introduction of stricter
selection and evaluation procedures. We exploited this
organizational change to conduct a retrospective before–
after study to examine how an increase in bootlegging
after the implementation of the organizational change
shaped innovative performance outcomes, controlling
for the individual’s innovative performance before the
formalization.
Bootlegging in Neptune
Unlike R&D staff employed in Google and 3M, scientists
and engineers in Neptune are not allowed dedicated or
slack time to work on “pet projects.” In fact, Neptune’s
researchers are required to declare how they spent their
time on the various projects within their formal work
plans; this accounting is audited by their managers. Some
scientists and engineers try to “work the system” and
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pursue underground activities to explore new opportuni-
ties. A senior product developer noted that
we should spend everything in declared space that should
be on our work plan. But, like with all creative and oppor-
tunistic work that I’m involved in, sometimes things pop
up that seem like too good an opportunity to have a little
bit of a dig. And then it could be that one of those then
actually turns into one of your big rocks, which is what
has just happened to me, with one of my projects.
In Neptune, there are numerous reasons for bootleg-
ging. It is undertaken to enable preresearch—for exam-
ple, collecting empirical evidence to demonstrate the
validity and potential of an idea before exposing it to
management (see also Augsdörfer 2005). Gathering data,
developing a prototype, or carrying out a pilot study
often requires the support of colleagues with a similar
passion for the idea:
It was probably a group of [Neptune] people who, kind
of, first started it, like, just kind of on the side, like we
[the interviewee and a colleague] thought this was a great
idea, then we did some prototyping, and then we shared
it with management, who created it into a project.
Another, more extreme form of bootlegging involves
continuing to pursue an idea that has been rejected
by management, which makes the activity closer to
the concept of creative deviance (Mainemelis 2010).
The following comments from a senior engineer illus-
trate this behavior when a novel idea was rejected by
management:
If the senior manager says that’s no good, he’s more pow-
erful than me. If I then go and get some data, then it
changes the whole power balance.
So when we [the interviewee and a fellow technolo-
gist started working on [the product], we started doing
the work and we went to our management and said, “Oh,
isn’t this fantastic.” And they said, “Don’t be stupid, peo-
ple tried that years ago, it’s never going to work, con-
sumers are going to hate it.” So we made [the product] by
hand and we found some people in the local vicinity; we
gave them some and asked them to try it. And they came
back and then we had another quick meeting with the
management and they said, “Don’t be so stupid, the con-
sumers won’t like it.” And we said, here’s some data that
says that ten consumers have tried it and nine of them
think it’s absolutely fantastic; they think they’d buy it.
In both cases, the main driver of these activities was
enthusiasm for discovery, as illustrated by the following
quote from a technologist:
It’s like exploration that I was not asked to look at, but
you know, I’m playing with those projects and if they
look promising after a while, then I’ll try and establish
those projects officially as part of my work plan and get
management’s support and funding and resources. And if
not, I’ll play with something else. There are things that
you typically manage to fit in your workload because you
have passion for them.
Researchers often go underground when they want to
explore new opportunities, when they feel their ideas
would be rejected were they to become official projects
at an early stage. A senior product developer noted,
[Underground activities] tend to be on the ideas that are
a little bit further out and aren’t as obvious, you know,
to what the potential could be.
It’s absolutely the wrong thing to ask management
whether you should work on something new, because
they all say no, all right, because they’re risk-averse. I’m
working on some new [product], okay, I am unlikely
to talk to the management about it until I’ve convinced
myself that it’s worth it. Otherwise, all you get is pain.
The formalization of the front end of the innovation
process promoted a widespread perception among our
interviewees that there would be significantly less tol-
erance for individuals who engage in unofficial projects
and efforts, as the following quotes from two technolo-
gists and an R&D manager, respectively, illustrate:
The front end of innovation used to be a lot more, kind
of, woolly, and 0 0 0people were just working on what they
fancied, and that isn’t the most effective way to run. But
I also think that one of the watch-outs with this is that
there is no real space for seedlings, or the kind of unex-
pected, because everything’s quite orchestrated, now.
This system is so prescriptive that it doesn’t give you
the opportunity to really freestyle around it, and I think,
in innovation, you need to have, you know, you need to
have the opportunity to bring new stuff in.
What’s happened now is that even in the front end of
innovation, you now have a list of projects, right? It’s
now been totally formalized, which then removes most
of your ability to go and do what you want to do.
Measures
Dependent Variable. Innovative performance. Nep-
tune conducts an annual evaluation involving a com-
mittee of line managers from the different business
divisions who assess the performance of individual tech-
nologists relative to peers. The line managers base their
appraisals on specific contributions to new products, pro-
cesses, features, business development, technologies, or
designs that create value for the organization. Rather
than focusing on the technologist’s scientific and techni-
cal outputs such as patents, assessment is based primar-
ily on the realized impact of the individual’s efforts, the
organization’s sales performance, and operating costs.
The contributions of each individual are tracked over the
year for this evaluation process and recorded on their
formal work plans. The appraisal system classifies indi-
viduals into two bands with a forced distribution across
the three seniority levels. We drew on this system using
the innovation rating as our measure of individual inno-
vative performance.
The rating process is highly competitive, and being
awarded the highest rating is a significant accomplishment
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that determines salary and promotion. In our sample,
24% of individuals received the highest rating. We asked
individuals to declare their innovation rating for each of
the last three years to allow us to control for past perfor-
mance and conduct additional analyses of the direction
of causality between bootlegging and individual innova-
tive performance.
Supervisors’ ratings have been shown to be rela-
tively unbiased, for example, in terms of gender or race
(Arvey and Murphy 1998), and hence they are consid-
ered a valid indicator of individual task performance
(e.g., Mehra et al. 2001). In addition, objective measures
of innovative performance (e.g., invention disclosures,
patent disclosures, research reports) can show high levels
of correlation with supervisors’ ratings (Scott and Bruce
1994, Tierney et al. 2006).
Although in our survey the innovation rating was self-
reported, it is not a self-assessed measure since the eval-
uation was made by others. In addition, in our research
context, the diverse roles and outputs of R&D scientists
make it difficult to use simple counts of specific inno-
vation outcomes, such as the number of new products,
as a measure of individual performance. The advantage
of the rating is that it accounts for the objectives spe-
cific to the individual’s work role and the nature of the
R&D efforts in his or her job function and unit. Neptune
senior managers and technologists considered the inno-
vation rating to be the central innovative performance
measure in R&D. In our interactions with Neptune, this
point was emphasized repeatedly, giving the measure a
high level of content and face validity.
Independent Variables. Bootlegging activity. Captur-
ing individual bootlegging efforts poses significant chal-
lenges for researchers because of their nonprogrammed
and often secretive nature. Previous work on bootlegging
uses research designs that study only bootleg projects
(e.g., Augsdörfer 2005). Although helpful for provid-
ing detailed insights into bootlegging, this approach can
introduce significant sample selection bias. In contrast,
our approach focuses on identifying bootlegging among
a diverse population of R&D scientists, whose levels
of bootlegging differ. Also, given its secretive nature, a
social desirability bias might affect measures of boot-
legging; individuals may be more likely to report lower
levels of bootlegging given the deviant nature of this
activity. We tried to overcome this problem by assuring
respondents of absolute anonymity. Moreover, since the
survey focused on a number of issues related to indi-
viduals’ innovative efforts, and because our interest in
bootlegging was not made explicit in the invitation let-
ter, we thought that respondents would be less likely to
hide (or exaggerate) their bootlegging activity.
To measure the extent to which individuals engage
in bootlegging, we developed a new measurement scale
building on our interview material and prior studies
(Augsdörfer 1996, 2005). To guide the shaping of our
scale items, we exploited terms used by interviewees,
such as “unofficial” or pet projects, to describe their boot-
legging at Neptune. Moreover, we were also concerned
that more strongly worded items might deter disclosure
since senior management was supporting our research
project. We constructed a five-item measure in which
all items were measured on a seven-point scale rang-
ing from 1 for strongly disagree to 7 for strongly agree.
Exploratory factor analysis of the five items using the
principal factor method resulted in a one-factor solution
(with an eigenvalue above 1), signaling the unidimen-
sionality of our scale and explaining 98% of the vari-
ance. Four of the five items had factor loadings above 0.4
(see Table 1); we excluded the item with a factor loading
below 0.4. The resulting bootlegging scale shows strong
internal reliability with a Cronbach’s  of 0.80.
As an additional measure, we consider the proportion
of time individuals allocated to bootlegging. The related
question came immediately after the question about
bootlegging described above so as to guide respondents
on the types of activities associated with bootlegging.
We asked individuals how much of a typical work week
during the previous 12 months had been devoted to
unofficial side projects, outside of formal work plans.
We asked respondents to provide the same information
for the three years prior to the survey. Time devoted to
bootlegging in 2010 and 2007 was used to derive the
measure growth in bootlegging time, calculated as the
difference in the log of the percentage of time allocated
to bootlegging in 2010 minus the log transformation of
the percentage in 2007. There is the possibility of recall
bias in the calculation for 2007 based on inaccurate rec-
ollection of the time dedicated to this activity three years
earlier. Although we cannot assess the extent of this
problem, we found it reassuring that the average time
allocated to bootlegging had decreased after formaliza-
tion of the front end of the innovation process.
Table 1 Principal Factor Analysis of the Bootlegging Scale
4= 00855
Factor
Scale items loading
I have the flexibility to work my way around my
official work plan, digging into new potentially
valuable business opportunities.
00608
My work plan does not allow me the time to work on
anything other than the projects I have been
assigned to.
00592
I enjoy tinkering around with ideas that are outside
the main projects I work on.a
00349
I am running several pet projects that allow me to
learn about new areas.
00762
I proactively take time to work on unofficial projects
to seed future official projects.
00784
aThis item had a factor loading below 0.4 and was removed when
factor scores were computed.
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Unit innovative performance. To measure unit in-
novative performance, we calculated the share of tech-
nologists with the highest innovation rating in 2009,
exploiting Neptune’s archival data on the distribution
of ratings across the entire population of technologists,
across all of its R&D sites. Neptune has over 20 units,
each having between 5 and 80 R&D staff members.
Unit bootlegging time. To measure unit bootlegging,
we derived the average bootlegging time of researchers
in 2007 for each R&D unit using all the survey responses
(N = 405). In calculating this measure, we dropped
those individuals in R&D units where fewer than three
employees had responded to our survey. We excluded
the focal individual when calculating unit average
bootlegging.
Control Variables. Building on the literature on the
determinants of individual-level innovativeness, we con-
trol for a number of individual and contextual factors.
First, we control for individuals’ grade level, since more
senior members of staff might have more autonomy in
their work (Amabile 1996, Bailyn 1985). Second, to con-
trol for individual perception of the work environment
as supportive of creative and innovative efforts, we use a
reduced version of the 22-item scale proposed by Scott
and Bruce (1994). We focused on the eight items that
loaded into the factor “support for innovation,” label-
ing it climate for innovation (Cronbach’s  = 0.86).
Third, to account for the effect of having a manager sup-
portive of creativity (Oldham and Cummings 1996), we
included a measure of managerial support, consisting
of a seven-item scale adapted from the scale developed
by Greenhaus et al. (1990), which measured the per-
ceived level of supervisory support for career advance-
ment. We modified this to capture the perceived level of
support received by senior scientists and engineers from
their peers on the management career ladder (Cronbach’s
= 0.94). Fourth, since research shows that both intrin-
sic motivation and extrinsic motivation play a role in
shaping individual creativity (Amabile 1996), we derived
measures of these motivations using an eight-item scale
adapted from Rynes et al. (2004). Respondents were
asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (not at all impor-
tant) to 5 (crucial) the importance of different features
of their job, such as intellectual challenge, degree of
independence, salary, and job security. The data were
subjected to principal factor analysis, which resulted in a
two-factor solution corresponding to intrinsic and extrin-
sic motivation with equal internal reliability (Cronbach’s
= 0.69).
To account for the possibility that the contributions of
technologists working on longer-term projects might be
more difficult to assess, we included a dummy variable
(long-term focus) equal to 1 if the outcome of the indi-
vidual’s research activities would take more than two
years to reach the market. Furthermore, since the poten-
tial to develop an innovation might be shaped by the
type of products targeted by the individual, we included
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent’s R&D
efforts were focused on improving an established prod-
uct line. Finally, we included control variables for gen-
der, tenure, and whether the individual was working at
the company headquarters, as well as dummy variables
for division and job function.
Although we use several individual-level variables to
account for significant differences in the individual abil-
ity to generate innovations, we may have failed to cap-
ture a particular individual characteristic that affects
both the likelihood of achieving a high innovation rat-
ing and the extent of bootlegging activity. Because a
past innovation rating might be a proxy for other indi-
vidual features for which we are unable to control, we
include this measure in our analysis. More specifically,
we include the past innovation rating (the two years
prior to our survey).2
Assessment of Common-Method Variance
Given that all the subjective measures used in this
study are constructed based on responses to the same
survey and are self-reported, it is possible that our
estimates might be affected by common-method and
single-respondent biases (Podsakoff et al. 2003). In try-
ing to mitigate this problem, we first used different
response formats to prevent response fatigue and the
tendency to agree or disagree with attitude statements
regardless of content. Then, we posed “neutral” ques-
tions at the beginning and more sensitive questions
(e.g., about managerial support) at the end of the sur-
vey to avoid context-induced mood, which might lead
respondents to carry over positive or negative evaluations
to subsequent questions. Finally, we used an inductive
approach with items generated on the basis of the inter-
views and worded items according to company jargon
to reduce complexity and/or ambiguity of scale items.
This was especially important in the context of the boot-
legging scale to ensure that respondents understood the
content of the questions. To test empirically whether
common-method variance remained an issue, we car-
ried out a Harman’s single-factor test by performing an
unrotated factor analysis including all 55 items across
the 11 constructs in our survey. We obtained 12 factors
with eigenvalues greater than 1, where the first factor
explained only 18.4% of the variance. This suggests that
common-method variance may not be a problem in this
study. We also adopted Lindell and Whitney’s (2001)
marker variable technique by including in the survey a
variable that is theoretically unrelated to the variables
of interest in our study.3 Because the marker variable
should not be correlated with other variables, the pres-
ence of common-method bias can be assessed by cal-
culating the correlations between the marker variables
and the variables of interest. We checked partial cor-
relations between all our variables, controlling for our
marker variable, and found that all significant bivariate
correlations among our variables of interest remained
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unchanged. Thus we can conclude that common-method
bias is unlikely to have shaped our findings.
Results
Because innovation rating is a dichotomous variable,
we tested our hypotheses by estimating logit models.
Individuals with low innovation ratings (“0-rated”) are
underrepresented in our sample with respect to the dis-
tribution of ratings across Neptune; thus we estimated
our models using weights equal to the number of 1-rated
(0-rated) respondents in our sample over the percent-
age of 1-rated (0-rated) respondents in the popula-
tion to attribute additional weight to the 0-rated group.
All equations were estimated clustering the errors by
respondent’s grade.4 Innovation rating has a forced dis-
tribution across the three seniority levels, which could
introduce correlation in the error terms, for individu-
als on the same grade. To test our main hypothesis, we
focused on bootlegging activities and time. In the mod-
eration analysis, we rely on bootlegging time because
this variable captures past rather than current bootleg-
ging efforts and therefore better accounts for reverse
causality issues.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and bivariate
correlations of the variables used in our econometric
models. On average, the scientists and engineers in our
sample have worked for Neptune for almost 20 years.
The level of correlation among our key variables is gen-
erally low. The maximum variance inflation factor is less
than 2.5, signaling that multicollinearity is not a problem
in our data.
Table 3 shows the tests for the impact of bootleg-
ging on innovation rating. Model 1 includes only the
control variables and represents our baseline model.
As expected, we find that past innovation rating
and average innovative performance of the R&D unit
employing the individual are strong predictors of the
innovation rating. Model 2 shows that bootlegging activ-
ities have a positive and significant effect on the likeli-
hood of obtaining the highest innovation rating: a one
standard deviation increase in bootlegging from its mean
value increases the individual’s chances of obtaining a
top rating by 6%. This provides support for Hypothe-
sis 1. Model 3 reports the effect of past bootlegging time
on innovative performance. Again, we find strong sup-
port for Hypothesis 1 since the coefficient of bootlegging
time at t−3 is positive and significant. In particular, our
estimates indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase
in bootlegging time from its mean value (i.e., from 14%
to 23%) increases the probability of obtaining a high
innovation rating by 17%.5
As a supplementary analysis, we also explored the pos-
sibility of a curvilinear relationship between bootlegging
and innovative performance by adding a squared term
for bootlegging activities and past bootlegging time to
Models 2 and 3, respectively. We obtained confounding Ta
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Table 3 Impact of Bootlegging on Innovation Rating and the Moderating Effect of Unit-Level Innovative Performance 4N = 2385
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Bootlegging activity a 00237∗∗∗
4000645
Bootlegging time at t− 3a 00681∗∗∗ 00657∗∗∗ 00685∗∗∗ 00667∗∗∗ 00639∗∗∗
4001745 4002005 4001685 4001925 4001785
Bootlegging time at t− 3 × 00322∗∗∗ 00286∗∗∗
Unit innovative performance 4000545 4000585
Bootlegging time at t− 3 × 00459∗∗∗ 00412∗∗∗
Unit bootlegging time at t− 3 4001705 4001825
Growth in bootlegging timea −00082∗∗∗
4000155
Unit innovative performancea 00803∗∗∗ 00777∗∗∗ 00812∗∗∗ 00796∗∗∗ 00805∗∗∗ 00773∗∗∗ 00812∗∗∗
4000425 4000585 4000265 4000215 4000285 4000225 4000225
Unit bootlegging time at t− 3 −00511∗∗∗ −00560∗∗∗ −00548∗∗∗ −00619∗∗∗ −00675∗∗∗ −00757∗∗∗ −00536∗∗∗
4001585 4001795 4001035 4000685 4001945 4001605 4001015
Grade −00868∗∗∗ −00938∗∗∗ −10173∗∗∗ −10159∗∗∗ −10232∗∗∗ −10242∗∗∗ −10160∗∗∗
4001785 4001875 4003295 4003325 4003435 4003565 4003185
Climate for innovation −00031∗ −00086∗∗∗ 00044∗∗∗ 00038∗∗∗ 00064 00050∗ 00069∗∗∗
4000165 4000035 4000135 4000115 4000505 4000285 4000085
Managerial support 00504∗∗∗ 00488∗∗∗ 00614∗∗ 00590∗∗ 00618∗∗∗ 00610∗∗ 00607∗∗
4001675 4001795 4002475 4002655 4002265 4002425 4002405
Intrinsic motivation 00454∗ 00413∗ 00472∗ 00487∗∗ 00469∗ 00486∗∗ 00485∗∗
4002325 4002335 4002495 4002385 4002545 4002475 4002465
Extrinsic motivation −00205 −00181 −00184 −00167 −00182 −00171 −00187
4001475 4001395 4001885 4002355 4001995 4002425 4001965
Gender −00609∗∗∗ −00671∗∗∗ −00331∗∗∗ −00295∗∗ −00305∗∗∗ −00289∗∗∗ −00288∗∗
4001145 4000895 4001185 4001415 4000885 4001115 4001295
Long-term focus −00600∗∗∗ −00649∗∗∗ −00681∗∗∗ −00765∗∗∗ −00686∗∗∗ −00780∗∗∗ −00667∗∗∗
4000065 4000135 4000465 4000195 4000635 4000245 4000455
Tenure 00029∗∗∗ 00031∗∗∗ 00048∗∗∗ 00041∗∗∗ 00045∗∗∗ 00041∗∗∗ 00047∗∗∗
4000045 4000065 4000025 4000035 4000025 4000025 4000025
Established product line 00451∗∗∗ 00459∗∗∗ 00341∗∗∗ 00382∗∗∗ 00352∗∗∗ 00372∗∗∗ 00341∗∗∗
4000485 4000485 4000245 4000455 4000175 4000725 4000315
Headquarters 00464∗∗ 00479∗∗∗ 00485∗ 00618∗∗ 00622∗∗∗ 00785∗∗∗ 00488∗∗
4001905 4001755 4002545 4002765 4002035 4002245 4002395
Past innovation rating 10550∗∗∗ 10550∗∗∗ 10731∗∗∗ 10710∗∗∗ 10736∗∗∗ 10738∗∗∗ 10740∗∗∗
4003205 4003505 4001915 4001925 4002185 4002065 4001915
Constant −00769∗∗∗ −00686∗∗∗ −00781∗∗∗ −00756∗∗∗ −00771∗∗∗ −00762∗∗∗ −0083∗∗∗
4001645 4001835 4002455 4002195 4002305 4002125 4002535
McFadden pseudo-R2 0020 00210 00250 00260 00260 00270 00250
Notes. Division and job function dummies are included. Robust standard errors for two-tailed tests are clustered by grade.
aStandardized by subtracting the mean from the value and dividing by the standard deviation.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
results; the squared term of bootlegging activities was
positive and significant, whereas the squared term of
past bootlegging time was negative and significant at the
10% level. In addition, we experimented by with repeat-
edly removing single items from the bootlegging activi-
ties scale and rerunning the analysis with these different
item combinations. The results did not change, which
suggests that our results are not dependent on a single
item in the scale.
In Model 4, we test Hypothesis 2, which states that the
effect of time spent on underground research activities
on innovative performance is amplified by the innovative
performance of the R&D unit employing the individ-
ual. Consistent with this hypothesis, Model 4 shows
that the interaction term for the amount of time that
an individual dedicated to bootlegging in 2007 and the
innovative performance of the R&D site is positive and
significant. Model 5 includes the interaction term for
individual bootlegging time in 2007 and average boot-
legging time of colleagues working in the same R&D
unit. The interaction term is positive and significant, sug-
gesting that the effect of bootlegging time is amplified
if the individual works in an R&D unit with high lev-
els of bootlegging. This supports Hypothesis 3. Model 6
includes both interaction terms, and it supports both of
our moderation hypotheses.
To interpret these moderation effects, we plot them
using the simulation-based procedure advocated by
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Zelner (2009). Interaction terms are more difficult to
analyze in nonlinear than in linear models because their
direction and magnitude are a function of all the other
variables in the model (Ai and Norton 2003). However,
a graphical representation of the predicted probabili-
ties is helpful. The method proposed by Zelner (2009)
computes the predicted probabilities of receiving a high
innovation rating at different levels of the moderated
variable (bootlegging time at t − 3) for high and low
values of the moderating variable (unit innovative per-
formance and unit bootlegging time at t − 3), setting
all the other control variables in the model to a given
value. We derived these plots by setting the moderat-
ing variables at two standard deviations below the mean
(low value) and two standard deviations above the mean
(high value), with all the remaining control variables as
described in Endnote 3. In line with Hypothesis 2, Fig-
ure 1 shows that, at high levels of unit-level performance
(the solid line), an increase in past bootlegging time
increases the likelihood of receiving a top innovation
rating, whereas at low levels of unit innovative perfor-
mance, an increase in bootlegging time in 2007 does not
affect the chances of receiving a high innovation rating.
Similarly, consistent with Hypothesis 3, Figure 2 shows
that the benefits of bootlegging exist only for individuals
working in units with high levels of bootlegging.6
Figure 1 The Moderating Effect of Unit Innovative
Performance on Bootlegging Time
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Figure 2 The Moderating Effect of Unit Bootlegging on
Bootlegging Time
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The effect of a change in bootlegging time during a
period of increased formalization of the front end of
the innovation process is reported in Model 7. Support-
ing the predictions in Hypothesis 4, the estimates from
Model 7 suggest that, after controlling for bootlegging
time in 2007, those individuals who increased the time
spent on bootlegging activities are less likely to achieve
a high innovation rating.
Testing for Reverse Causality
As suggested above, because of the cross-sectional
nature of our data, there is a possibility that the results
could be affected by endogeneity bias. Using past val-
ues for innovation rating helps to address the problem
of omitted variables bias but does not rule out reverse
causality as another source of endogeneity. It might
be that innovative performance determines bootlegging
rather than vice versa because more successful individ-
uals may have more autonomy and may have earned
sufficient “credit” to engage in bootlegging activities.
To address this, we carried out a Granger (1969) causal-
ity test exploiting information on the time individuals
reported spending on bootlegging activity in 2010 (boot-
legging timet) and 2007 (bootlegging timet−3) combined
with information on innovation rating in 2010 (inno-
vation ratingt), 2009 (innovation ratingt−1), and 2008
(innovation ratingt−2):
Bootlegging timet
= 1 Bootlegging timet−3 +2 Innovation ratingt−1
+3 Innovation ratingt−2 + controls + 1 (1)
Innovation ratingt
= 1 Bootlegging timet−3 +2 Innovation ratingt−1
+3 Innovation ratingt−2 + controls + 0 (2)
Since the coefficient of bootlegging time at t− 3 is sig-
nificant in Equation (2) (1 = 001661 p = 0001), but the
innovation rating at times t−1 and time t−2 are not sig-
nificant in Equation (1) (2 = −10252 and 3 = −00401,
respectively), we can conclude that bootlegging drives
innovative performance, but not vice versa.
Conclusions
Our investigation of the nature and effect of individuals’
bootlegging efforts on innovative performance high-
lighted a practice in R&D that is often referred to but is
rarely observed systematically. In describing bootlegging
as an attempt by R&D scientists to gain higher levels
of strategic autonomy through nonprogrammed, under-
ground R&D efforts, we linked bootlegging to notions
of proactive and deviant creativity, helping to extend our
understanding of how individuals in large, mature orga-
nizations break free of the constraints of accountability
to generate innovations. Drawing on theories of proactive
creativity and innovation, we explicated the mechanisms
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that link a bootlegger’s efforts to innovative performance,
suggesting that bootlegging enables individuals to gain
both explorative advantage over colleagues and more
time and space to nurture and substantiate embryonic
ideas before organizational assessment.
In addition, we suggested that the costs and benefits
of bootlegging for innovation are contingent on the
emphasis that the work environment places on norma-
tive enforcement. The impact of individuals’ bootleg-
ging efforts on innovative performance is heightened
in the context of high unit innovative performance
and the bootlegging efforts of their colleagues, set-
tings where the achievement of goals prevails over the
means by which they are achieved. In contrast, individ-
uals who increase their bootlegging during periods of
formalization—where a greater emphasis on conformity
to rules signals that the opposite change of behavior
is expected—cannot count on support and tolerance for
their bootlegging behavior. Exploiting a major organiza-
tional change in our studied organization toward greater
formalization at the front end of the R&D process, we
found that, despite the benefits that bootlegging might
bring even during formalization periods, increasing the
amount of time dedicated to underground research has
a negative impact on individual innovation performance.
We argued that increasing bootlegging, perhaps out of
frustration over the proposed organizational change, can
lead to a misalignment between the individual’s R&D
efforts and corporate objectives, reducing the ability of
the former to generate innovations that the organization
can incorporate in its products and technologies.
Implications for Theory
Our study has important implications for our under-
standing of creativity and innovation. First, it has been
argued that the ability of individuals to be creative or
innovative depends on the balance between the degree of
autonomy allowed by their organizations and the extent
to which their work is monitored and constrained by
accountability practices (Burgelman 1983, Kanter 2000,
Van de Ven 1986). Our study adds to this body of liter-
ature: we found that what matters is not just the degree
of strategic autonomy that organizations grant to their
staff but also the degree to which individuals seek to
increase their strategic autonomy, on their own initiative,
in settings where it is constrained. We portrayed boot-
legging as the means by which individuals create greater
strategic autonomy in high-accountability settings and
found that engaging in underground R&D efforts helps
them to produce innovations for the organization. These
results suggest that the autonomy–innovation relation-
ship is shaped by the form of autonomy sought by indi-
viduals, as stressed by Bailyn (1985), in addition to the
autonomy that is formally granted.
Second, our study unpacked the mechanisms that
enable individuals to gain from bootlegging. Although
the literature on bootlegging shows that it is an important
form of bottom-up, nonprogrammed innovation effort
(Abetti 1997; Aram 1973; Augsdörfer 1996, 2005), the
mechanisms through which it stimulates innovation are
mostly implicit. Building on March (1991, 2006), we
posited that bootlegging might facilitate the exploration
of new domains along unconventional paths that fall
outside the remit of formal projects. Moreover, by pay-
ing attention to the specific contextual features of R&D
in large, mature organizations, we identified delayed
assessment of embryonic ideas as an additional mecha-
nism that links underground creative efforts to innova-
tive performance. R&D workers can use bootlegging to
postpone the monitoring and assessment of early-stage
ideas until they are better developed. They may even
reintroduce rejected ideas that they have continued to
work on until the environment has become more con-
ducive. By exploring these two mechanisms, we docu-
mented the pathways through which bootlegging shapes
innovative outcomes, and we helped to ground the con-
cept of bootlegging as an important form of proactive,
deviant creativity (Mainemelis 2010, Unsworth 2001).
Third, we contributed to the literature on bootlegging,
and on creative deviance more broadly, by demonstrating
that the benefits of bootlegging are highly contingent on
the work environment. Although bootlegging takes place
underground and remains hidden from senior managers,
it is unlikely to promote innovation in settings where
behavioral norms and conformity to rules are rigidly
enforced. Our theorizing and results suggest that an indi-
vidual’s bootlegging efforts tend to be successful only
in high performance work settings and in the presence
of fellow bootleggers. In such environments, local man-
agers and coworkers are more likely to provide support
for bootleggers in their exploration of novel and uncon-
ventional ideas and to provide guidance and understand-
ing when these ideas eventually reach the surface of the
organization. In the absence of these conditions, bootleg-
ging will fail to result in innovative outcomes and should
be regarded as a costly use of organizational resources.
We also showed that, during periods of formalization,
increasing the time dedicated to bootlegging has neg-
ative effects on individual innovation performance and
thus is considered a cost to the organization. This may
be because individuals who increase their deviation from
the formal work allocation system—during a period of
greater formalization, where greater emphasis on rules
and procedures prescribes the opposite behavior—risk
not only misalignment between their innovation efforts
and corporate innovation objectives but also alienation
from colleagues and managers. In exploring these con-
tingencies, we showed when and how proactive and
deviant forms of creativity shape innovative outcomes
and increased our understanding of how organizational
change toward more formalization shapes the benefits
and costs of proactive and deviant creativity for the
individual.
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Implications for Practice
Although bootlegging is an activity initiated by individ-
ual scientists and engineers, by providing a work set-
ting where accountability and conformity to rules and
procedures are prioritized over autonomy, or vice versa,
organizational decision makers have a major indirect
influence over individuals’ ability to gain from their
bootlegging behavior. Local managers can choose to tol-
erate or condemn the bootlegging efforts of their staff.
We believe our findings have important implications for
managers and organizations.
First, formal R&D management systems may help to
promote alignment and improve selection, but these mon-
itoring efforts may drive some R&D activities under-
ground. Our study suggests that underground efforts,
rather than undermining the goals and needs of the or-
ganization, may produce significant innovations for the
organization. We suggest that managers use monitor-
ing mechanisms, such as R&D management, as a form
of “soft power” to provide guidelines and incentives
for alignment and coordination of creative efforts with-
out invoking the organization’s “hard power” (i.e., the
enforcement of norms through sanctions and punish-
ment), which may crush independent initiative (Nye 2004).
In this sense, R&D management should be seen as an
enabling form of bureaucracy rather than a “clenched
fist” that stops the deviant, creative efforts of individ-
uals (Adler and Borys 1996). However, the notion that
bootlegging has positive benefits for the achievement of
innovation in organizations cannot be extended too far.
Most of the individuals in our study engaged in rela-
tively modest levels of bootlegging (on average, 14%
of their time) and were able to combine this activity
with their formal project work. All bootlegging efforts
should eventually be integrated into the organization to
ensure that the latent potential of employees’ ideas can
be fully realized by the wider organization. Ultimately,
senior management must decide whether it would be
worthwhile to scale up these initiatives (Burgelman and
Grove 2007).
Second, although our focus was a high-accountability
organization that provides no free time for its staff, our
results can be related to the question of how organi-
zations might nurture creative efforts by allowing such
free time. Our study suggests that even in organizations
where there is no explicit free time, unofficial R&D
efforts are commonplace. An implication of this finding
is that free-time programs may only legitimize some-
thing that already occurs within organizations (Garud
et al. 2011). Moreover, and somewhat paradoxically,
by providing dedicated free time, organizations might
reduce the allure of these hidden creative efforts since
they are no longer forbidden. The critical question is to
what extent the deviance of an act adds to its emotive
and behavioral attraction (see Becker 1997): Does the
forbidden nature of the “fruit” increase its sweetness?
Or, alternatively, is it the formally provided autonomy
that counts, or is it the autonomy that individuals achieve
informally through underground activities? It might be
more productive for organizations to impose restrictions
on the free time of would-be innovators in order to
heighten its allure while tolerating the existence of boot-
legging and enabling the integration of its outputs into
the organization’s formal management processes. This
approach might be less expensive in terms of managerial
resources than organization-wide provision of unstruc-
tured free time, but it could be just as productive.
Limitations and Future Research
Our study has several limitations that lead to questions
for future research. First, because our study focuses on
a single, high-accountability organization, we should be
cautious about generalizing our results to other organi-
zations. Although Neptune is a fairly diverse organiza-
tion with many autonomous units, across sites there are
few differences in its human resource practices. This
means we cannot explore how different practices within
and between firms might influence the relationship
between bootlegging and innovation. Also, our single-
organization setting means that we cannot compare the
effectiveness of governance arrangements for encourag-
ing the creative behavior of individuals, such as free-
time models versus bootlegging. Similarly, we cannot
compare the performance implications of a change in
the time allocated to bootlegging between individuals
experiencing or not experiencing the introduction of the
formalization of the front end of the innovation process.
That is, in our quasi-natural experiment, we lack a con-
trol group to allow a counterfactual analysis, which lim-
its our ability to provide an unambiguous demonstration
of causation.
Second, bootlegging is difficult to measure because
it is a deviant form of behavior in that it takes place
without organizational approval. We attempted to tailor
our bootleg measures to the specific context of Neptune.
Although this approach helps to ensure the context valid-
ity of our measurement, it also limits applicability to
other organizational settings. To try to elicit information
from respondents on underground activity, we used mild
terms, such as “unofficial projects,” since even in anony-
mous surveys, individuals may underreport bootlegging.
Other methods, such as in-depth observation, time logs,
and detailed case studies, might provide a more detailed
picture of the nature of underground efforts inside orga-
nizations and the implications of these efforts for the
organization’s ability to innovate. Future research could
compare the innovation journey of bootlegged versus
nonbootlegged projects inside organizations.
Third, this study relied on a single measure of indi-
vidual performance, innovation rating, which is sub-
ject to important limitations. Although the innovation
rating has benefits related to its face validity and
applicability across job roles in Neptune, alternative
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measures of performance obtained from archival data,
such as patent applications or invention disclosures,
would have provided additional evidence on the impact
of bootlegging on individuals’ abilities to innovate.
However, in promising anonymity to try to obtain a
more reliable measurement of bootlegging, we sacrificed
the possibility of pairing our survey data with company
records of performance at the individual level.
Finally, our study focused on the bootlegging efforts
of individuals and how these efforts shape their con-
tribution to the organization’s innovative performance.
This means we cannot comment directly on the impact
of bootlegging for teams and units. We also cannot
assess the impact of manager’s response to bootleg-
ging. To obtain a better understanding of this activity,
future research with a multilevel setup could examine
more organized forms of bootlegging to investigate team
and/or unit-level underground activities and how these
efforts shape performance at each level. Similarly, a
multilevel study could assess whether other unit-level
characteristics in addition to those explored in this paper
affect the ability of an individual to benefit from under-
ground R&D efforts.
By theorizing and measuring the impact of the under-
ground efforts of individuals in R&D on innovation,
this paper has shed new light on a perennial managerial
challenge—the need to support creativity while simul-
taneously ensuring that efforts are well managed and
aligned with the organization’s goals and capabilities.
It suggests a range of future research to provide a bet-
ter understanding of how proactive and deviant creative
efforts can support and sustain organizational renewal
and development.
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Endnotes
1Responses to this survey have been used in other working
papers (Salter et al. 2012, Ter Wal et al. 2011).
2Although introducing lagged values of the dependent variable
does not completely rule out endogeneity issues arising from
omitted variables bias, in the absence of valid instruments,
it should substantially mitigate this problem (Wooldridge
2009). Because the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
as an explanatory variable might lead to autocorrelation in the
error terms and thus to inconsistent estimates (Greene 2003),
we used the innovation rating for two years prior to our sur-
vey, which is not highly correlated with the current innovation
rating (the phi-correlation coefficient between the current rat-
ing and rating two years earlier is 35%). In addition, Monte
Carlo simulations (Beck et al. 1998) show that the problem of
autocorrelation of the error terms in this context is less severe
in logit than in ordinary least squares models.
3We use as a marker variable a self-developed three-item scale
on environmental concern at work (Cronbach’s  = 0.62),
which can be assumed to be unrelated to bootlegging activity
and innovative performance.
4To account for the error terms across our observations not
being statistically independent, which arises from the unit
innovation performance variable not varying among individu-
als working in the same unit, we also estimated our weighted
logit models clustering the errors by unit in addition to grade.
We found that the moderation effect of unit innovative perfor-
mance on past bootlegging time remains significant, with the
same sign and comparable coefficient size.
5To derive the magnitudes of the effects of bootlegging activ-
ities and past bootlegging time, we set the past innovation
rating to 1, unit innovative performance to 0.25, seniority level
to 2, gender and long-term focus dummies to 0, and head-
quarters and established product dummies to 1, leaving all the
other control variables at their mean values.
6In an additional analysis, we retested H2 and H3 moderating
the unit-level variables with bootlegging activities instead of
bootlegging time. The results are consistent with the findings
reported for bootlegging time.
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